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The paper explores the role of workers’ expectations as an original ex-
planation for the puzzling long run persistence of observed discrimination
against some minorities in the labor market. A game of incomplete infor-
mation is presented, showing that ex ante identical groups of workers may
be characterized by unequal outcomes in equilibrium due to their di¤er-
ent beliefs, even though discriminatory tastes and statistical discrimina-
tion by employers have disappeared. Wrong beliefs of being discriminated
against are self-con…rming in this circumstance, being the ultimate cause
of a lower percentage of promotions which supports these wrong beliefs.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
Despite the several contributions to the literature, a widely shared explana-
tion for the long run persistence of discrimination in the labor markets is still
not apparent. Moreover, the neoclassical theory of discrimination is mostly a
demand-side theory. Very few are the contributions where workers’ heterogene-
ity matters, and, to the best of my knowledge, only a recent paper by Breen
and Garcia-Penalosa (2002) studies the possibility that unequal outcomes may
arise for reasons attributable to workers’ expectations. The goal of this paper is
to set up a static model where preferences and beliefs of both sides of the labor
market matter. The advantage of a theoretical framework obtained following
this approach is twofold. First, the main contributions to the discrimination
literature can be nested and therefore jointly analyzed. Second, it is possible
to explore the role of workers’ expectations, so far neglected in the literature,
w h i c ha r ei n s t e a dt h ef o c u so ft h i sp a p e r .
The model is formalized as a two-stage game of incomplete information in
which populations of workers and employers are engaged. In every stage game
two workers, one of which belonging to a minority group, and one employer
are randomly matched. The employer promotes one (and only one) of the two
workers after having observed their output, which is a function of e¤ort and
tastes for work, both unobservable. Therefore, promotions depend on both
employers’ and workers’ type as well as on their beliefs about opponents’ type-
strategy pro…le. Crucially for the results of this paper, promotions depend
via e¤ort on workers’ expectation about the unknown employer’s type, which
captures the possible disutility of promoting a minority worker.
The importance of workers’ expectations can be appreciated comparing the
equilibrium outcome in terms of promotions arising when minority workers over-
estimate the percentage of discriminatory employers as opposed to a situation
in which beliefs are correct ceteris paribus. Even in a labor market where dis-
criminatory tastes have disappeared, statistical discrimination is absent and the
distribution of ability and tastes for work is the same across groups of work-
ers, unequal outcomes may still arise due only to workers’ expectations. It is
worth stressing that such assumptions are made in order to test workers’ expec-
tations as a “stand-alone” source of unequal outcomes from a theoretical point
of view, not because other sources are regarded as negligible. What happens is
that wrong beliefs to be discriminated against are self-con…rming in equilibrium.
Minority groups who expect to be discriminated against supply less e¤ort on
average, because of a lower expected return. This induces a lower percentage of
promotions within minority workers even though employers do not discriminate
against them either directly or statistically. In turn, this outcome is consis-
tent with minority workers’ beliefs that there are employers characterized by
discriminatory tastes.
Minority workers do not “test” their beliefs, meaning that they do not verify
whether the employers would have promoted them had they chosen higher e¤ort.
The reason is that no single worker has any incentive to experiment, because,
like when information cascades occur, his observation would have a negligible
1information value. Moreover, the main result, i.e. that unequal outcomes may
be ascribable to workers’ di¤erent expectations, is robust both to trial work
periods, which are instead an e¤ective policy device to break down statistical
discrimination outcomes, and to a not too strong degree of a¢rmative actions
like quotas. The conclusion is that workers’ expectations can contribute to
explain the puzzling long run persistency of unequal outcomes observed in the
labor market.
The structure of the paper is the following. After some de…nitions are out-
lined in Section 1.1, the stage game of the model, i.e. the game after the players
have already been matched, is presented (Section 2.1). The population game,
the matching process and the information structure, necessary to characterize
beliefs, are described in Section 2.2. The connections of the model to the related
literature are sketched in Section 3. Section 4 concentrates on the analysis of
the equilibria of the model and its policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 De…nitions
Before going on with the presentation of the model, it is useful to clarify the
meaning attached to some concepts throughout the paper.
First, in what follows productivity stands for output per worker. It does
not refer to a worker’s innate characteristic. In this model productivity is some-
thing endogenous, determined by ability, e¤ort and tastes for work. Therefore,
a more productive worker is simply a worker characterized by a higher output.
Second, in the literature many di¤erent and occasionally contradicting def-
initions have been used for discrimination in the labor marker. Discrimination
has been de…ned either as di¤erent achievements (wages, promotions) for equally
productive workers, or as di¤erent achievements for ex ante equal workers, i.e.
for workers with the same ability and tastes for work. Not infrequently, the
two concepts have been used interchangeably, but this seems inappropriate, be-
cause ex ante equal workers can be characterized by di¤erent productivity in
equilibrium.
A good compromise, referring in part to Blau, Ferber and Winkler (2002),
is to use two di¤erent de…nitions. On the one hand, following the “equal pay
for equal work” principle, direct discrimination can be de…ned as a di¤erent
treatment in terms of wages, promotions, or job allocations for equally produc-
tive workers.1 On the other hand, also a more comprehensive de…nition seems to
be necessary. The reason is that it would be hard to consider as discriminatory
an employer who pays or promotes minority workers less (on average) if they are
(on average) proportionally less productive. Nevertheless, it would be mislead-
ing to disregard that many factors, and direct discrimination can be among the
most important ones, may a¤ect workers’ behavior. If minority workers are less
productive for example because they have changed their behavior reacting to a
worse job assignment, the di¤erent achievements should not be viewed as equal
treatment, even if there is no more direct discrimination. Such a situation is
1Often the de…nition of direct discrimination refers to “equally quali…ed” workers.
2captured by the more comprehensive concept of cumulative discrimination,
de…ned as di¤erent achievements for ex ante equal workers.
Another distinction that deserves to be mentioned is that between group and
individual discrimination. The former happens when di¤erent achievements are
observed on average either between groups of workers that are on average equally
productive (direct group discrimination) or between groups of workers which are
ex ante equal (cumulative group discrimination). The latter happens when an
individual is judged also on the basis of group membership rather than upon his
or her own characteristics only. Individual discrimination is a characteristic of
all the models of incomplete information and concerns both the majority and the
minority group. Moreover, it does not imply group discrimination. Henceforth,
even though not speci…ed, discrimination always refers to group discrimination.
2 The Model
The model is formalized as a two-stage game of incomplete information where
populations of workers and employers are engaged. The two populations of
workers di¤er because of an observable characteristic (race, gender, etc.) which
does not a¤ect their output (productivity) ¼. The observable characteristic
distinguishes the so called majority worker, identi…ed by superscript A,f r o mt h e
so called minority worker, identi…ed by superscript B. Employers are denoted
by superscript F:
The following section focuses on the stage game, i.e. on what happens after
the players have been drawn from their populations and matched. The popu-
lation game, the matching process and the information structure, necessary to
characterize beliefs, are described in Section 2.2.
2.1 The Stage Game
In every stage game two workers, one of which is a “minority” worker, and one
employer are drawn from their populations and play. In the …rst period both
workers choose one out of three possible levels of e¤ort eA
1 ;e B
1 2 E = fl;i;hg;
where l stands for “low”, i stands for “intermediate” and h stands for “high”.
The employer observes workers’ productivity in the …rst period and promotes
one (and only one) of the two workers. After having observed employer’s deci-
sion, workers choose a level of e¤ort for the second period eA
2 ;e B
2 2 E:
The stage game is characterized by observable actions, because the decision
about promotion is directly observed and every level of (observed) output is
o n et oo n er e l a t e dw i t he ¤ o r t . 2 The game is also characterized by incomplete
information, because every player knows his or her type only.
2More precisely, ¼ = e: See section 2.1.2, assumption 2.
32.1.1 Incomplete Information
mA 2 MA and mB 2 MB; summarize the type of majority and minority work-
ers, respectively. Workers’ type represents their tastes for work, formalized as
a weight attached to the disutility of e¤ort (see equations (1) and (2) below).
The lower the parameter, the lower the cost of e¤ort.
mF 2 MF represents employer’s tastes for discrimination. If mF > 0 the em-
ployer su¤ers a disutility when the minority worker is promoted. If mF =0the
employer is indi¤erent about the observable characteristic which distinguishes
the workers.
Assumption 1. Every player knows hisnher own type only. Therefore,
a minority worker knows her own tastes for work mB, while the type mA of
the majority worker and the tastes for discrimination mFof the employer are
unknown.3
2.1.2 Payo¤s
The structure of the utility function is the same for majority (A) and minority
(B) workers and it is parametrized according to their type m. The analysis













































t is the wage in period t for the worker belonging to population P.
eP
t is e¤ort in period t for the worker belonging to population P.
® =1if worker A is promoted,
® =0if worker B is promoted,
K>1 summarizes that the job assigned to the promoted worker is more
desirable, because for any given level of e¤ort the disutility will be lower.
Assumption 2. wt = ¼t = et: Labor market is assumed to be competi-
tive, therefore productivity is entirely paid to workers. Moreover, productivity
coincide with e¤ort. Assumption 2 makes the game equivalent to the reduced
form of a more general game where workers’ output is observed and veri…able
and employers compete on enforceable piece-rate contracts. Workers are free to
move, but in equilibrium wt = et and nobody moves.4
Assumption 3: The set of workers’ types is MA
1 = MB
1 = f1g in the …rst
period and MA
2 = MB
2 = f1;Kg in the second. Tastes for work are assumed to
3Of course, the same holds mutatis mutandis for player B and F:
4The assumption that ¼ = e implies that ability does not matter in this model. A more
general version in which ability varies across workers but is identically distributed populations
turns out to be much more complicate without being more insightful (see also footnote 5).
4matter in the second period only, while in the …rst period they are the same for
all workers.5 There are only two possible types of worker.
It follows from the utility function in (1) and (2) that in the second period
e¤ort will be higher if the worker is promoted
eA¤
2 j(® =1 ) =
K
2mA >e A¤




2 j(® =0 ) =
K
2mB >e B¤
2 j(® =1 )=
1
2mB:
Substituting the type of workers M = f1;Kg into these equations, makes it
immediately evident that a bad type who is promoted supplies the same e¤ort
o fag o o dt y p ew h oi sp r o m o t e d .
The speci…cation of the utility function adopted in the paper is the same
that have been proposed by the asymmetric tournament literature.6 The only
di¤erence is that the role of the prize is played by the lower cost of e¤ort attached
to the job assigned to the promoted worker.








Both in the …rst and in the second period there are only three conceivable levels
of e¤ort l>i>h>0 that stand for “low”, “intermediate” and “high.” These
levels coincide with the optimal choice in the second period of a bad type who
is not promoted, of a bad type who is promoted as well as of a good type who
is not promoted, and of a good type who is promoted, respectively.
As far as the employer is concerned, the utility function contains both prof-
its and a parameter summarizing the disutility associated to the promotion of
workers B: This means that only workers B face the risk to be discriminated
against, because of the observable characteristic that, without a¤ecting their
productivity, di¤erentiates them from workers A: Since productivity is assumed
to be entirely paid to workers, in this model discrimination can only assume the
f o r mo fd e n y i n gap r o m o t i o nt oaw o r k e rB that would deserve it. Employer’s
utility function is




2 )¡(1 ¡ ®)m
F
where u>1 is a known and constant mark up on workers’ productivity due to
the entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, u ¡ 1 represents pro…ts as a function
of workers productivity. In order to maximize pro…ts, the employer needs to
maximize worker’s productivity. In other words, the employer has an incentive
to promote the more productive worker.7 The term (1 ¡ ®)mF represents the
5This assumption is important. Allowing di¤erent tastes for work in the …rst period would
de facto resolve employer’s uncertainty about workers’ type before the decision about promo-
tion is taken. Such an uncertainty is instead necessary to get the results that are shown in
section 4. To get the same results even relaxing this assumption it is necessary that at the
same time ability is not restricted to be costant for all workers. A more plausible model would
be obtained providing the same insights at the price of a substantially increased complication.
6See O’Kee¤e, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984).
7It is also possible to interpret F as a supervisor rather than an employer. Instead of
pro…ts, the supervisor maximizes a bonus which is a fraction of the overall productivity of the
workers. Nothing would change in practice, because also the supervisor has the incentive to
promote the more productive worker in order to maximize hisnher bonus.
5disutility associated to a promotion of a minority worker: When mF =0the
observable characteristic that distinguishes the workers does not matter and
pro…ts are the only thing that the employer considers. On the other hand,
when mF > 0 the employer is characterized by discriminatory tastes, and the
minority worker is less likely to be promoted.
Assumption 5: The set of employer’s types is MF = f0;dg; with d !1 :
There are only two types of employer. One type is characterized by discrimina-
tory tastes, with the disutility d t h a ti sa s s u m e dt ob es oh i g ht h a tp r o m o t i n g





is indi¤erent about the observable characteristic that dis-
tinguishes workers.
2.1.3 Strategies
Workers move twice, the second time after the decision about promotion has
been taken by the employer, choosing e¤ort simultaneously. The strategy s of a
worker is therefore a triple containing an e¤ort level for the …rst period, and two
e¤ort levels for the second period, one if promoted, another if not promoted.
For both populations of workers e¤ort can take the same three values only:
e1;e 2 2f h;i;lg. The strategy set is also type-independent, meaning that every
worker faces the same possible choices Sm;A = Sm;B = S.
The employer observes each worker’s productivity in the …rst period and
then promotes one (and only one) of them in a more rewarding position. The
set of feasible actions for the employer, regardless of hisnher type, is simply
® = f0;1g; where ® =1stands for “promotes worker A”a n d® =0stands for
“promotes worker B”. As far as the employer is concerned, strategies sF are
therefore a vector that speci…es a promotion decision for every possible pair of
observed productivity levels.
Assumption 6: Employers strategies are weakly monotone in productivity
Pr
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This means that the probability to be promoted cannot decrease when e¤ort
increases ceteris paribus. This assumption is a way to re…ne the set of equilib-
ria. The intuitive reason is that promotions are desirable, and workers may be
willing to give up utility in the …rst period in order to enhance their probabil-
ity to be promoted. The way to do this is to deviate from e¤ort i in the …rst
period, where i is the optimal choice in a world without promotions, supplying
either l or h: Assumption 6 means that all players agree that the way to signal
one’s willingness to be promoted is through a higher e¤ort. All the equilibria
that could possibly arise when workers signal their willingness to be promoted
supplying l are excluded. Moreover, exerting e¤ort l in the …rst period turns
out to be strictly dominated for all workers.
Assumption 7: Strategies of non-discriminatory employers implement a
fair contest. Given two generic productivity levels ¼0
1;¼00
1 in the …rst period,
6and two generic expected productivity levels ¼0
2;¼00











meaning that fair tournaments are robust to the permutation of contestants,
and promotions depend on productivity only (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981). The
rationale is to avoid that unequal outcomes may arise because of asymmetric
choices of employers who are instead supposed to be indi¤erent to workers’
membership. When expected productivity of the two workers in the second





h;h ! 0;5 (3)
where the action is de…ned as “percentage of workers A promoted” and for
example \h;i" means that the productivity levels of worker A and worker B are
“high” and “intermediate,” respectively.8;9
To complete the description of the stage game, also players’ beliefs need to
be speci…ed. Before de…ning players’ beliefs, however, it is necessary to describe
how players are matched and what information they can access.
2.2 The Population Game
The stage game described in section 2.1 is inserted in a wider game, called
population game, which speci…es how players are matched and what information
they can access. The description of the information structure allows to de…ne
players’ beliefs.
There are three populations, one of employers and two of workers. As already
said for the stage game, the two populations of workers di¤er because of an
observable characteristic (e.g. gender, race, etc.) that does not a¤ect their
productivity.
Assumption 8: The distribution of types within the two populations of
workers is identical. This assumption rules out the possibility that unbalanced
promotions across populations arise because of a di¤erent average disutility of
work.
8Pairs of productivity levels where e¤ort l is involved are not considered because l is strictly
dominated for both workers under assumption 6.
9When non-discriminatory employers only are involved, the game becomes somehow related
also to an all-pay auction, insofar as the utility loss su¤ered by a non-promoted worker who
choosed e¤ort h instead of i is sunk, see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996).
72.2.1 Matching
Each of the three populations P = fA;B;Fg is composed by an in…nite number
of identical cohorts, and every cohort is composed by a continuum of players.
The assumption of a continuum of players is necessary to invoke the law of
large numbers which ensures that the actual fraction of any given combination
of types of A;B and F players coincides (almost surely) with its probability.
The three populations play an in…nitely repeated game, while each cohort plays
only one “round”, i.e. a two-stage game. At every stage only one cohort from
population A; one cohort from population B; and one cohort from population F
play. Each of the “active” players, i.e. the players of the only cohort engaged in
the game, of population A is randomly matched with one of the “active” players
of population B and one of the “active” players of population F:
2.2.2 Information Structure
Although all cohorts within each population are equal, identifying di¤erent co-
horts is far from being irrelevant. On the contrary, cohorts are very important
to characterize the information structure. In particular, the division of the pop-
ulation into di¤erent cohorts captures a very important feature: the game is
repeated in…nitely among populations, but each player participate in just one
round. This has the very important implication that individual outcomes are
a useless source of information when compared to available aggregate outcomes
arising from previous rounds.10 The intuition is also related to the literature on
information cascades.11 Information cascades occur when the initial decisions
of opponents coincide in a way that it is optimal for the subsequent individuals
to ignore their private signals and follow the established pattern. In this case,
regardless of whether aggregate outcomes coincide or not, what happens is that
individual outcomes cannot be capable of counterbalancing the information that
can be inferred from aggregate outcomes.
Aggregate outcomes consist of an array of distributions of observables ^ ¾ =
(^ wA
1 ; ^ wB
1 ; ^ ®; ^ wA
2 ; ^ wB
2 ); where ^ wA; ^ wB are the distributions of wages (equal to pro-
ductivity) within each population of workers in every period. ^ ® is the percentage
of workers A promoted. If di¤erent from 0:5, ^ ® signals the presence of unequal
outcomes.
2.2.3 Beliefs
Beliefs of a player are a probability measure over the unknown component of the
type-strategy set M £S = MA £MB £MF £SA £SB £SF: Given that every
player is supposed to know hisnher own type and the strategy henshe chooses
only, the unknown component of M £S turns out to be the set of type-strategy
10Using aggregate outcomes instead of individual outcomes rules out the possibility that
unequal outcomes arise in equilibrium, like in Breen and Garcia-Penalosa (2002), as an iner-
hitance of past di¤erences in fundamentals.
11For a detailed presentation of information cascades, the reader is referred to Banerjee
(1992) and Bickchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992).
8pro…les of all the other players, both the opponents and the other players of
hisnher own population. Beliefs of a worker of population A when hisnher type
is m are de…ned12
¹m;A2 ¢(M £ S):
Assumption 9: Beliefs exclude the possibility that opponents correlate their
play. In other words, it holds that:
¹m;A(mA;sA;mB;sB;mF;sF)= ¹m;A(mA;sA)¹m;A(mB;sB)¹m;A(mF;sF):
Since every player knows hisnher own type and strategy, the appropriate marginal
distribution for worker A is
¹m;A(mB;sB;mF;sF)= ¹m;A(mB;sB)¹m;A(mF;sF):
Something more needs to be said about employers’ beliefs. Before deciding,
the employers have the opportunity to update their beliefs observing work-
ers’ productivity. Employers’ prior beliefs are a probability measure over each
worker’s type-strategy pro…le ¹m;F ¡
mA;s A);¹ m;F(mB;s B¢
: Such beliefs can
be revised independently using Bayes rule, given that productivity of worker A









the probability that an employer of type m assigns to the productivity level
¼A
1 2 ¦A according to hisnher prior beliefs, updated beliefs after the observation







1 ) if mA;s A : ¼A
1 =~ ¼A
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Although this paper does not deal with dynamics, I think it is useful to
provide an intuition about how beliefs may be formed in this game. To do this
a bit of “thought dynamic” is necessary. Beliefs of a player at time t can be
thought to be a function of the available information about aggregate outcomes
arising from the previous period ^ ¾t¡1: It is worth noting that the same sequence
of observables can lead to di¤erent beliefs. In other words, players can interpret
in di¤erent ways the same information about aggregate outcomes. For exam-
ple, workers can interpret a given distribution of promotions across populations
A and B assigning di¤erent weights to the role played by workers’ e¤ort and
employers’ propensity to discriminate against the minority. Of course, asymp-
totic empiricism requires that in equilibrium all the belief rules must generate




9subjective distributions of observables which coincide with the objective one.
This means that in equilibrium di¤erent belief rules for identical workers can
survive only if generating observationally equivalent subjective distributions of
outcomes.
Before characterizing the equilibria of the game presented so far, it is useful
to review brie‡y some of the contributions to the discrimination literature.
3 Related Literature
The model presented so far is ‡exible enough to capture, under appropriate
assumptions, the main features of most of the contributions to the discrimination
literature.13 One thing that must be taken into account is that although these
contributions often focus on wages rather than promotions, the main stylized
facts can be replicated focussing on promotions as well.
Six groups of models are presented: discriminatory tastes, statistical dis-
crimination, human capital theory, feedback e¤ects, workers’ expectations and
asymmetric tournaments.
3.1 Discriminatory Tastes
The starting point of the economic analysis of discrimination in labor markets
can be found in the article “The Economics of Discrimination” by Becker (1957).
In Becker’s model, the existence of direct discrimination between workers of dif-
ferent groups, which are perfect substitutes in the production function, is based
on the discriminatory preferences of employers, coworkers or customers. Hence,
discrimination is caused by fundamentals (discriminatory tastes), while beliefs
do not play any role because there is no uncertainty. Within this framework,
members of the discriminated group must receive a lower wage in order to be
accepted as employees, coworkers or sales.
The following are the assumptions that should be imposed into the model
presented in Section 2.1 and 2.2, in order to make it equivalent to the discrimi-
natory tastes approach.
1. Employer’s type set is a singleton MF = fdg; with d>0.
2. Beliefs assign a probability equal to one to the true type-strategy pro…le
of the opponents (absence of uncertainty). In other words, expectations
do not matter.
13The main goal of the following survey is to shed some light on the area surrounding the
model presented in this paper. Theories have been selected and outlined in such a way as
to facilitate contrast and comparison with the model of workers’ expectations. Therefore,
the choice of the contributions to be summarized is far from exhaustive, concentrating only
on the theoretical aspects of some competitive neoclassical models and institutional theories.
Also the relative weights assigned to various aspects of such theories re‡ect primarily the
necessity of the subsequent presentation, rather than some sort of consensus about what has
been considered more important in the literature thus far. Another reason for these choices
is that many detailed surveys are already available (see Blau, Ferber and Winkler (2002) and
Cain (1986) among others).
10While in the Becker’s model discrimination takes the form of di¤erent pay
for equal work, in the game obtained imposing these assumptions discrimination
takes the form of promoting always worker A:
Among the advantages of Becker’s approach, there is the possibility of ex-
plaining the rise of any type of direct discrimination (based on sex, race, religion,
etc.). On the other hand, the major problem lies in its long run implications: if
markets are competitive and there is heterogeneity of discriminatory tastes, only
the less discriminatory employers (or the non-discriminatory ones if present)
should survive. The reason is that discrimination is costly for the employer,
so that when competition drives pro…ts toward zero discriminatory employers
would su¤er a negative utility. Alternatively, we should observe complete seg-
regation. However, both predictions are contradicted by empirical evidence.
3.2 Statistical Discrimination
Within statistical discrimination models, group membership is assumed to con-
vey information regarding individual characteristics, about which incomplete
information is assumed. Several models have been developed within this strand
of literature using di¤erent devices in order to explain the long run persistence
of observed discrimination. Common to these models is the fact that, di¤erently
from Becker’s one, fundamentals are not relevant.
The most representative model of statistical discrimination has been pro-
posed by Arrow (1973).14 Employer’s beliefs about the existence of di¤erent
characteristics between (ex ante identical) groups turn out to be correct in
equilibrium. Why are these expectations con…rmed in equilibrium even if the
groups were equal ex ante? In other words, why are these beliefs self-con…rming?
The mechanism is the following: a worker’s a priori unobservable variable (e.g.
e¤ort) is endogenously a¤ected by employer’s beliefs (e.g. via lower wages, or
via worse job assignments), leading to a suboptimal investment in his/her skills
(or a suboptimal supply of e¤ort) and therefore determining an outcome that
con…rms the beliefs of the employer. The conclusion is that in equilibrium there
is cumulative but not direct discrimination, because worker are ex ante equal
but show a di¤erent productivity in equilibrium.
Statistical discrimination outcomes, as modeled by Arrow, can be obtained
within the framework of section 2.1 and 2.2 only if accepting some changes to
the structure of stage game.15 Such changes are necessary because in Arrow’s
model the employer plays using prior beliefs, contrarily to the game presented
above. Promotions have to be modi…ed into job assignment decisions for the
14Other examples of statistical discrimination can be found in Phelps (1972), who concen-
trates on the e¤ect of an imperfect predictor of the true productivity of a worker, and Spence
(1973), in his pioneristic work about signaling. A skeptical reading of the statistical discrim-
ination approach can be found in Aigner and Cain (1977) and Cain (1986). Some of the
arguments raised by Cain are relevant also in the context of the model of workers’ expectation
p r e s e n t e di nt h i sp a p e ra n da r et h e r e f o r ee x p l i c i t e l ya d d r e s s e di nw h a tf o l l o w s .
15One could certainly argue that strictly speaking Arrow’s model cannot be nested in the
model of section 2.1 and 2.2, given that it is necessary to de…ne a di¤erent stage game.
11two models to be equivalent. Hence, the whole …rst period has to be cancelled
and appropriate assumptions has to be made accordingly.
1. Employers’ strategies coincide now with feasible actions f® =1 ;®=0 g;
with ® =1standing now for “assign worker A to the good job and worker
B to the bad job” and vice versa for ® =0 .16 Workers’ strategies contain
two e¤ort levels, one if assigned to the good job and another if assigned
to the bad job.
2. Payo¤s become:















3. Discriminatory tastes do not play any role, i.e. the set of employer types
is a singleton MF = f0g: Having employer’s action been observed, this
implies that workers’ expectations do not matter any more, because when
they move their uncertainty has already been resolved.
4. Employers believe that minority workers are on average less productive




about productivity of worker A if assigned to the good job, statistical
discrimination means that the average productivity if assigned to the good













Employer expect minority workers to be less productive, and therefore assign
them to the bad job. Worse job assignment causes minority workers to exert
a lower e¤ort, with the result that ex post they are actually less productive,
con…rming employer’s expectations.
Statistical discrimination models have been criticized by Cain (1986), on
the ground that “this models face the criticism that the employer’s uncertainty
about the productivity of workers may be inexpensively reduced by observing
the workers’ on-the-job performance.” Workers’ performance can be observed
for example by means of trial work periods. Cain’s argument can straightfor-
wardly be encompassed into the model presented in this paper going back to
the original version of the stage game, where updated beliefs are used to decide
on promotions and where the whole …rst period can be thought as a trial work
period. Nonetheless, the statistical discrimination model plus trial work period
leaves some open questions: what determines workers’ behavior in the trial work
16T h eg o o da n dt h eb a dj o bc o i n c i d ew i t ht h ej o ba s s i g n e di ns e c t i o n2 . 1t ot h ep r o m o t e d
and to the non-promoted worker, respectively.
12period? Is it convenient for them to increase e¤ort to be assigned to the good
job? The answers to these questions cannot be found within the statistical dis-
crimination literature, because it is necessary to analyze also the supply side
of the labor market. In section 4, where the role of workers’ expectations is
analyzed, it emerges that trial work periods are not an e¤ective policy device
to break down unequal outcomes, as long as minority workers believe they are
discriminated against.
3.3 The Human Capital Theory
Another strand of the literature, started by Mincer and Polacheck (1974), is the
so-called human capital theory which analyzes the e¤ects of voluntary choices of
investment in human capital from a gender perspective. According to this the-
ory, women decide to invest less than men because they expect a lower lifetime
return on human capital due to a shorter and more discontinuous presence in
the labor force. As a consequence, they receive less on-the-job training and/or
are assigned to less rewarding jobs. Such behavior can be ascribed to the tra-
ditional division of work within the family (Becker, 1985). In this way, wage
di¤erentials, worse career path, and/or sex segregation are explained by volun-
tary choices. If this is the case, the di¤erent achievements could not be classi…ed
as discrimination, given that workers neither equally productive in equilibrium
nor ex ante equal.










: Having a higher average disutility of e¤ort,
minority workers …nd optimal to supply on average a lower e¤ort. Hence,
they are less productive.
A criticism that some economists moved to this approach (see the next sub-
section) is that the seemingly “voluntary” decision could be actually induced
by discrimination, entering the de…nition of cumulative discrimination.
3.4 Feedback E¤ects
The boundaries of this approach are particularly uncertain,17 and usually sur-
veys concerning labor market discrimination use these models as a counterpart
for other theories, without analyzing them separately. The reason is that the
contributions that can be grouped into this category are quite heterogeneous:
17A large number of the so called “institutional” contributions may also fall into this cate-
gory. Cain (1986) includes also the above-mentioned model by Arrow (1973) within this goup.
The seminal “institutional” contribution has been made by Myrdal (1944), who theorizes the
“principle of cumulation”, a mechanism of dynamic causation between several variables. These
variables move together in‡uencing each other once the system is hit by an external shock.
Among the secondary causes of discrimination, the behavior of workers is also taken explicitly
into account: “Negro worker often feels that his fate depends less on his individual e¤orts than
on what white people believe about Negroes in general” (Myrdal, 1944). Other contributions
follow along the line of the vicious circle described by Myrdal, like Ferber and Lowry (1976).
13the main idea they have in common is that the behavior of the workers can in
turn be determined by discrimination. However, the mechanisms through which
the behavior is a¤ected vary considerably. In many cases there is also a lack of
formalization and these e¤ects are little more than qualitative statements.
Blau and Jusenius (1976), reverse the causality link with respect to Mincer
and Polacheck (1974): women, because of experiences of sex discrimination, e.g.
lower wages, respond with career interruptions and specialization in household
production, i.e. investing less in human capital.
No speci…c assumption is necessary to nest this approach into the game of
section 2.1 and 2.2, because the presence of workers’ expectation is per se aw a y
to formalize such feedback e¤ects.
3.5 Workers’ expectations
As already mentioned, the neoclassical theory of discrimination is mostly a
demand-side theory. But why should workers’ preferences not be allowed to play
a role as important as that of either employers’ preference in the discriminatory
tastes approach or employer’s beliefs in the statistical discrimination models?
To the best of my knowledge, the only paper in the literature on discrim-
ination that focuses on the supply side of the labor market is that of Breen
and Garcia-Penalosa (2002), who explain the observed persistence of gender
segregation using a Bayesian learning approach. Workers, due to imperfect in-
formation, do not know and try to learn how much the probability of success in
various occupations is a¤ected by e¤ort or by predetermined individual charac-
teristics (such as gender). The “prior” of a man (woman) is the belief received
by his father (her mother), while the posterior is the belief updated according
to his (her) experience and transmitted to his son (her daughter). Di¤erent
preferences between men and women at some point in the past caused di¤erent
learning paths and di¤erent beliefs. This is a su¢cient condition to observe last-
ing unequal outcomes in equilibrium for the two groups, even once preferences
become equal, meaning that past circumstances continue to exert an in‡uence
and that expectations can be self-ful…lling.
Similarities of this paper with the work of Breen and Garcia-Penalosa are
evident: both consider the e¤ect of heterogeneity within the supply side of the
labor market and both explain the persistence of unequal outcomes via self-
con…rming workers’ expectations. Besides a dynamic setting that prevents it to
be nested within the framework of Section 2.1 and 2.2, what di¤ers in the model
of Breen and Garcia-Penalosa is a di¤erent information structure. Agents learn
from their parents only, but not from observable aggregate outcomes. Moreover,
only agents choosing a “high” pro…le of education and e¤ort are able to learn
from their experience and transmit updated beliefs to their children, while for
the “low” pro…le the learning process stops. The key mechanism behind the
results of these authors, is that the information structure of the model prevents
agents from learning that di¤erences in fundamentals have disappeared. In
other words, beliefs are still a function of di¤erences in workers’ fundamentals.
Section 4 will show that when such an assumption is relaxed within a static
14framework, workers’ expectations can still explain observed unequal outcomes.
3.6 Asymmetric Tournaments
The literature on tournaments, started by Lazear and Rosen (1981), is not
directly related to discrimination. Nevertheless, asymmetric tournaments, as
described by O’Kee¤e, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984), provide a useful frame-
work for the analysis of the e¤ects of discrimination on promotions. Therefore,
asymmetric tournaments are a natural and valuable benchmark for the game
presented in this paper. As already mentioned, a tournament is symmetric
when outcomes are robust to the permutation of the contestants. On the other
hand, asymmetric contests are de…ned “uneven” when agents are di¤erent, and
“unfair” when contestants are identical but the rules favor one of them.
Within the literature on uneven tournaments, it is incidentally mentioned
that unequal outcomes may arise between ex ante equal groups of workers.18
However, the underlying mechanism has not been formalized and, more specif-
ically, no role is explicitly played by expectations. Another di¤erences with
respect to this model is that e¤ort is continuous and imperfectly observable.
Moreover, there is only one period and the winner is determined by the largest
drawing of e¤ort together with possible handicaps imposed by unfair rules. Pre-
dictions that emerge throughout the paper will be compared with the corre-
sponding predictions coming from asymmetric tournaments. Not surprisingly,
a lot of similarities arise.
4 Analysis of the equilibria
In this section two qualitatively di¤erent set of equilibria are presented. The
…rst set (see Proposition 1) displays symmetric outcomes under the assumption
that expectations of all players are correct. The second set of equilibria (see
Proposition 2) shows that unequal outcomes may arise when minority workers’
expectations are wrong ceteris paribus.
Two di¤erent concepts are necessary to analyze the equilibria of the model:
the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (henceforth: BNE) and the Self-Con…rming (or
Conjectural) Equilibrium (henceforth: SCE).19 Both concepts can be meant to
represent steady states of adjustment processes based on learning. The two
concepts share the feature that each player maximizes utility given hisnher be-
liefs, updated whenever possible, about every possible opponents’ type-strategy
pro…le (see section 4.1). The di¤erence between them is that in a BNE each
player has a correct conjecture about the relationship between opponents’ types
and choices, i.e. about their behavioral rules. In the commonly applied subcase
when beliefs satisfy the Common Prior assumption, beliefs about opponents’
18See Schotter and Weigelt (1992).
19For a thorough exposition of the characteristics of SCE the reader is referred to Battigalli
(1987) and Fudenberg and Levine (1993 and 1998). The generalization of the SCE to the case
of aggregate outcomes is described in Filippin (2002a).
15types turn out to be correct as well. Counterintuitively, when the Common
Prior assumption is not satis…ed, beliefs in a BNE may be contradicted by the
evidence. On the contrary, in a SCE beliefs may not coincide with the true
distribution of opponents’ type-strategies pro…le, as long as they are not contra-
dicted by the evidence (see Battigalli and Guaitoli (1997) for a formal discussion
of the relation between the Common Prior assumption, BNE and SCE in games
of incomplete information).
Equilibria in both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are Bayes-Nash and Self-
Con…rming at the same time. This is fairly intuitive in Proposition 1 given
that the Common Prior assumption is satis…ed and therefore beliefs are correct.
Nevertheless, this is the case also in Proposition 2 despite the Common Prior is
violated. In fact, although workers A and B have a di¤erent beliefs about the
fraction of discriminatory employers, the associated Bayes-Nash Equilibria are
Self-Con…rming nevertheless (see section 4.2).
4.1 Utility maximization given beliefs
a) Employers.
Only workers’ di¤erence in productivity after the promotion a¤ects em-
ployer’s decision, while the di¤erence in the …rst period does not. The reason
is that the disutility mF is associated to the promotion of a minority worker.
Therefore, at the margin only bene…ts from the promotion of a minority worker
(i.e. di¤erence in productivity after promotion) are compared with the associ-
ated cost mF in order to decide which worker is optimal to promote.
Employers of type mF =0are not a¤ected by the observable characteristic
that distinguishes workers A from workers B, and therefore they do not su¤er
a disutility promoting a minority worker: Hence, they will always promote the
worker they think will be more productive after the promotion, regardless of
the population where henshe comes from. If workers are of the same type
the overall productivity and the employer’s utility after the promotion are the
same regardless of the worker who is promoted. On the other hand, if workers’
type is di¤erent the employer maximizes hisnher utility promoting the worker
characterized by higher tastes for work (i.e. lower m):
De…ning ¹0;F(¼A
2 j¼A
1 ) the updated beliefs of a non-discriminatory employer
about the productivity ¼2 of worker A in the second period having observed ¼A
1
in the …rst, it follows that the best reply BR0;F ¡
¼1j¹0;F¢
to the observed pair
of productivity levels ¼1 =( ¼A
1 ;¼B
1 ) will depend on the comparison of workers’
expected productivity in the second period. Formally:
BR0;F ¡
¼1j¹0;F¢



















which means that promoting a majority worker is the best reply whenever the
majority worker is expected to be strictly more productive in the second period,
16given the observed productivity levels. Similarly, promoting a minority worker
is the best reply whenever equation 4 holds with reversed inequality sign. If
expected productivity in the second period is the same, the non-discriminatory
employer is indi¤erent. This means that both ® =1and ® =0as well as all
the mixed strategies would be best replies.
Employers of type mF = d are characterized by tastes for discrimination.
Assumption 5 implies that regardless of any observed and expected productivity
level of the two workers:
BRd;F(¼1j¹d;F)=f® =1 g
b) Workers.
Workers’ optimal actions in the second period according to their type and
employer’s decision have already been derived when describing assumption 3.



































As far as …rst period is concerned, l can be easily shown to be a strictly domi-
nated action for all workers as long as employers’ strategies are monotone (as-
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+ ¹f® =1 jhg
K
4
+( 1¡ ¹f® =1 jhg)
1
4
where ¹f® =1 jig and ¹f® =1 jhg are the probabilities to be promoted that
this worker thinks to have when playing i and h; respectively.20 Therefore, type




1 = h) ¡ Um
A=1(em
A=1
1 = i) > 0
which leads to
¹f® =1 jhg¡¹f® =1 jig > (K ¡ 1):
Similarly,
20In ¹f®j¢g; the superscript identi…yng the type and population of the player is omitted in
order to avoid a heavy notation.
17² a worker mB =1will choose h if ¹f® =0 jhg¡¹f® =0 jig > (K ¡ 1);
² aw o r k e rmA = K will choose h if 1
K (¹f® =1 jhg¡¹f® =1 jig) > (K ¡ 1);
² aw o r k e rmB = K will choose h if 1
K (¹f® =0 jhg¡¹f® =0 jig) > (K ¡ 1):
It is worth noting that when there is no chance to be promoted, the left
hand side of these equations vanishes and therefore, given K>1;hcannot be
an optimal choice.
4.2 Correctness of beliefs
Beliefs are correct when for all the players ~ n of every type m of each popu-
lation the subjective probability distribution over opponents’ type-strategy set
coincides with the objective distribution. For instance,
¹m;A(mB;s B;m F;s F)=P r ( mB;s B;m F;s F) (5)
intuitively means that the probability assigned by players of type m of popula-
tion A to every combination of opponents’ type-strategy pro…le is correct.
Beliefs are not contradicted by the evidence whenever all the players assign
a probability equal to one to the particular combination of observables ~ ¾ =
(^ ¼
A
1 ; ^ ¼
B
1 ; ^ ®; ^ ¼
A
2 ; ^ ¼
B
2 ) that is actually observed.21 In more technical terms, it
means that the observed distribution of outcomes arising from all the stage
games played in a given round coincides with the distribution generated by




~ n (m;s)=P rf¾g
where the subjective probability to observe a given element ¾ is obtained sum-
ming up the probabilities attached to every combination of type-strategy pro…les
that lead to a combination of observables equal to ¾:It may happen that incor-
rect beliefs, i.e. beliefs which violate (5) for some type m or strategy s; are not
contradicted by the evidence.22
4.3 Existence of the equilibria
This section focuses on the role of workers expectations. Appropriate assump-
tions are imposed in order to neutralize all the other potential causes of unequal
outcomes.
21An example of a combination of observables in this game is:










=1 ;Prf® =1 g =0 :5;:::)
which means that all the players supply a high e¤ort in the …rst period, that promotions
are balanced across populations and so on concerning the second period.
22The intermediate case, when beliefs are correct only as far as the behavioral rules are
concerned, can be represented in the following way:
¹m;A(sB;s FjmB;m F)=pr(sB;s FjmB;m F)
¹m;A(mB;m F) 6= pr(mB;m F)
18Assumption 10: beliefs both of employers and of workers A are correct
¹F(¢)=¹A(¢)=P r ( ¢):
Assumption 11: beliefs of workers B concerning the type-strategy pro-
…le of both workers A and the other workers B are correct ¹B(mA;s A)=
Pr(mA;s A);¹B(mB;s B)=P r ( mB;s B):
Assumption 12: beliefs of workers B about employers’ behavioral rules are
correct ¹B(sFjmF)=P r ( sFjmF):
Assumption 13: all workers B share the same beliefs about employers’
type. This assumption is crucial for unequal outcomes to be produced by work-
ers’ expectations within this extremely simpli…ed version of the model. In fact,
a small fraction of minority workers with correct beliefs would be enough to
falsify wrong beliefs of the other workers of that population. This would be
a serious problem if the goal of the paper was to claim that workers’ wrong
expectations to be discriminated against are the only explanation for observed
unequal outcomes. On the contrary, less ambitiously as well as much more real-
istically, the paper is simply aimed at stressing that workers’ expectations can
play a relevant role. Such a goal is pursued in a way that isolates the role of
workers’ expectations as much as possible. Not surprisingly, equilibria are not
robust to some perturbations like that implied by the relaxation of assumption
13, unless some additional degrees of freedom are obtained. For instance, this
can be done allowing beliefs of workers B to di¤er also concerning other type-
strategy pro…les, i.e. relaxing assumption 11 at the same time, or allowing more
heterogeneity of fundamentals within the model.
Similarly, some of the other assumptions made so far are very convenient
from the theoretical point of view because they allow to neutralize other causes
of unequal outcomes. For instance, assumption 8 excludes any role of the human
capital approach, while assumption 10 rules out statistical discrimination out-
comes.23 It deserves to be stressed once more that such assumptions are made
with the only purpose to focus the theoretical analysis on the role of workers’
expectations and not because the other causes of unequal outcomes are regarded
as less important.
Considering the assumptions made so far, only one possible di¤erence be-
tween workers A and workers B survives in the model: their expectations about
employers’ type. In particular, beliefs of workers B about employers’ type may




is the percentage of non-discriminatory employers. Proposition 1 and Proposi-
tion 2 contrast what happens in these two di¤erent situations, everything else
being equal.
Proposition 1 When expectations of workers B about employers type are correct;
a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium always exists where
1) in the …rst period both types of population A c h o o s et h es a m ea c t i o n so f
the corresponding type of population B:





23The e¤ect of disciminatory tastes has not been neutralized because it is straigthforward




=1in Propostion 1 and 2
19When also expectations of workers B about employers type are correct,
it means that beliefs of all players are correct, thanks to assumptions 10-12.
Therefore, ¹(®j¢) can be substituted with Pr(®j¢) and the conditions that make
















































) ¸ (K ¡ 1) for mB = K (9)
Since under assumption 6 it holds that
1
K
(Pr(®jh) ¡ Pr(®ji)) · Pr(®jh) ¡ Pr(®ji)
there cannot be an equilibrium in which a worker with a higher cost of e¤ort is










Before obtaining the optimal choices in the …rst period, it is necessary to
analyze the maximization problem of the non-discriminatory employer. The
candidate equilibrium strategy in (3) establishes that the employer promotes
the worker displaying the higher productivity, while a coin is tossed when pro-
ductivity is the same. Proposition 1 considers a situation in which both types
of population A choose the same action of the corresponding type of population
B: There are three possible situations: a) all the workers choose h; b) all the
workers choose i; c) e
m=K;P
1 = i and e
m=1;P
1 = h: Given that the distribution
of types within populations is the same by assumption 8 and that employer’s
beliefs about the distribution of workers’ type are correct, in a) and b) the em-
ployer would be certainly indi¤erent. In c) an employer facing i;i or h;h is
indi¤erent, while if h;i or i;h are observed, it is optimal to promote the worker
who supplied the higher productivity, i.e. the “good” type. Hence the strategy
is actually a best reply.
If there are non-discriminatory employers only, the candidate equilibrium






















































It deserves to be noticed that incentives to supply h are the same for both popu-
lations even when there are discriminatory employers. This is intuitive, because
20the assumption that discriminatory employers always promote A makes the in-
centive to exert e¤ort h proportional to the percentage of non-discriminatory
employers. In the limit situation where there are only discriminatory employers,
promotion stops to be an incentive device for both populations, because A are
sure to be promoted, while B have no chance. This parallels the …nding within
unfair tournaments that both agents exert the same level of e¤ort in equilibrium.
Substituting equations (10) and (11) into equations (6)-(9) above, the con-












> (K ¡ 1) for worker mA;m B = K:
Obviously, the presence of a strictly positive fraction of non-discriminatory
employers is necessary for promotions to work as an incentive device. Accord-
i n gt ot h ep a r a m e t e rK di¤erent combinations of e¤ort are observed in the …rst
period, all representing a BNE with the characteristics 1) and 2) of proposi-
tion 1 and consistent with the candidate equilibrium strategy for the employer
proposed in (3).
Regardless of the value of K; the fraction of workers A who are promoted is









=1 ; promotions are balanced across populations. In the
s e c o n dp e r i o da n di nb o t hp o p u l a t i o n sw o r k e r so ft y p em =1who are promoted
supply h; workers of type m = K who are promoted and workers of type m =1
who are not promoted supply i; workers of type m = K who are not promoted
supply l:
BNE described in Proposition 1 are not unique. For instance, there are other
BNE associated to strategies of the employers di¤erent from (3). Outcomes
of these equilibria can di¤er from those characterized above. However, these





workers A promoted; there exists also another equilibrium,




workers A are promoted other things being equal.24
What changes if ¹B(mF)=P r ( mF) does not hold anymore, i.e. when
workers B overestimate the percentage of discriminatory employers? Assuming
that ¹B(mF) 6=P r ( mF) while assumption 10 still holds means that beliefs
do not satisfy the Common Prior assumption anymore. In principle, given
that beliefs about opponents’ behavioral rules are correct for all players, the
equilibria that arise are still BNE although beliefs may be not only incorrect but
also contradicted by the evidence. However, Proposition 2 refers only to BNE
that are also SCE, i.e. BNE where beliefs are not contradicted by the evidence,
because otherwise (some) players would have the opportunity to modify their
wrong beliefs.
24Characteristics of equilibria di¤erent from those proposed in Proposition 1 has been ana-
lyzed by means of simulations.
21Proposition 2 Wrong beliefs of minority workers which overestimate the per-
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characterized by
1) all workers A supplying h and all workers B supplying i
2) only workers A being promoted.
Conditions under which unequal outcomes arise in equilibrium.
For such an equilibrium to exists, conditions for the convenience of workers
A to supply h do not change with respect to (6) and (7). As far as workers B
are concerned, instead:




¹B f® =0 jhg¡¹B f® =0 jig
¢
>K ¡ 1 for m = K (13)
The same strategy as in (3) for non-discriminatory employers, together with
the assumption that discriminatory employers promote only workers A; implies




























for workers A and B; respectively.
Combining (8), (9), (12), (13), (14) and (15) the conditions that make h the






















¸ (K ¡ 1) for mB = K
According to the values taken by the parameter K; di¤erent situations may
emerge. When K belongs to the same interval that would lead to the com-
bination h;h under the Common Prior assumption, when workers believe the







1+2P rfmF =0 g
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(16)
players’ utility maximization implies that all workers B supply i and all work-
ers A supply h in line with the …rst part of the proposition.25 It is worth
noting that a necessary condition for this inequalities to hold is exactly that

















would imply that (16) does not hold. The result
that e¤ort di¤ers across otherwise identical workers because of their di¤erent
beliefs, may also be interpreted as a formal justi…cation for the existence of
uneven touraments between ex ante equal workers.
Since all the workers of population A supply h and all the workers of pop-
ulation B supply i; employers’ strategy (3) implies that only workers A are
promoted (second part of the proposition). Such a strategy is in turn a best
reply for the employers. Being the expected productivity in the second period
the same regardless of the worker who is promoted, the employer is actually
indi¤erent.
Empiricism
Workers A and employers have correct beliefs about other players’ type-
strategy pro…les. Hence, the objective distribution of observables coincide with
the subjective distributions implied by their beliefs.
Wrong beliefs of workers B concern employers’ type only. Assumption 11
implies that their expected distributions of productivity (and therefore wages)
within populations in the …rst period are correct. Associated to the observed
outcome “worker A supply h - worker B supply i" their correct beliefs about
employers strategies are associated to no worker B promoted. Finally, also the
expected distribution of wages within population in the second period is correct.








First of all it is worth of notice that uniqueness refers to the vector of ob-
servables (productivity and promotions) and not to the array of strategies and
beliefs that characterize an equilibrium. In other words, there can be many
observationally equivalent equilibria, i.e. many arrays of strategies and beliefs
that generate the same vector of observables. Second, it deserves to be clari…ed
that the importance of stressing such a uniqueness does not go beyond the goal
of addressing a possible question of the reader, who could otherwise reasonably
wonder whether there are other equilibria and what characteristics they have.
Needless to say, uniqueness relies upon the whole set of assumptions that have








In order to show the uniqueness of the vector of observables described in
Proposition 2, the …rst step is to delete all the combinations of productivity
levels that derive from combinations of strategies that have no chance to be
observed.26 Among all the combinations of productivity levels that have a
positive probability to be observed, it can be shown that ¼A
1 = h;¼B
1 = i is the
only one that might not needfully lead to employers’ best responses that falsify
minority workers’ wrong beliefs. A necessary condition for the wrong beliefs
not to be contradicted is that also the non-discriminatory employers promote
worker A after observing ¼A
1 = h;¼B
1 = i:
26For instance, given assumption 6, it can never be the case that a “bad” type of worker








implies that for a worker B it cannot be optimal to supply a
strictly higher e¤ort than the corresponding type of worker A as long as they share the same
beliefs about employers’ strategies (from assumptions 10 and 12).
23Hypotheses behind Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 di¤er only because of
expectations of workers B: In Proposition 1 such expectations are correct, while
in Proposition 2 workers B are assumed to overestimate the percentage of dis-
criminatory employers. Results di¤er considerably, with wrong expectations
to be discriminated against worsening unequal outcomes with only workers A
promoted.27 Furthermore, nothing changes from the theoretical point of view




=0(absence of discriminatory employ-
ers), meaning that workers’ expectations are a “stand alone” source of unequal
outcomes.
Minority workers do not “test” their beliefs, meaning that they do not verify
whether the employers would have promoted them had they chosen higher e¤ort.
The reason is that no single worker has any incentive to experiment, because
his observation would have a negligible information value. Only if a su¢ciently
large fraction of minority workers experiments supplying high e¤ort can the
initial beliefs be contradicted, but this cannot happen because of a “free-riding”
problem.
Comparing results in Proposition 1 with what happens in Proposition 2, it
turns out that workers B are worse o¤ while workers A are better o¤, because
of the change in the probability to be promoted that become more favorable
for the latter. Also employers are worse o¤. Being proportional to workers’
productivity, pro…ts are lower in the …rst period given that workers B supply i
rather than h while pro…ts do not change in the second period:
4.4 Policy implications
Trial work periods can be an e¤ective policy tool to break down statistical
discrimination outcomes, i.e. a situation where employers’ wrong beliefs are
self-con…rming. On the contrary, the equilibria described in Proposition 2 are
robust to trial work periods, for the simple reason that trial work periods a¤ect
employers’ expectations rather than workers’ expectations. As long as minority
workers think to be discriminated against, during the trial work period they
will display a lower productivity. At the end of the …rst period of the game,
that can be regarded as a long trial work period, employers observe workers A
supplying a higher productivity and promote them even without discriminating
statistically against the minority.
Quotas can also be implemented to correct unequal outcomes. Despite be-
ing e¤ective to increase the number of minority workers promoted, quotas do
this without a¤ecting the mechanism that generates unequal outcomes in equi-
librium. The simplest way to implement quotas is to impose that at least a
percentage q>0 of minority workers must be promoted, with q known by all
players. In this model, given that only one worker from each population partic-
ipates to every stage game, such a result can be obtained imposing a lottery to
27Observing only workers A promoted is certainly a knife edge result. This is due to the
strong assumptions made throughout the paper. Having more than two types of workers, for
instance, makes it possible to observe equilibria in which the fraction of workers A promoted
is greater than that of the corresponding BNE with Common Prior, but lower than one.
24the employers. The outcomes of this lottery are that with probability q employ-
ers are forced to promote the minority worker, while with probability 1¡q they
are free to choose according to their preferences and updated beliefs. Paradoxi-
cally, after the introduction of quotas workers B are less likely to exert e¤ort h
in the …rst period. In fact, conditions for h being an optimal choice become:28
(1 ¡ q)0:5¹B ©
mF =0
ª







¸ (K ¡ 1) for mB = K:













¸ (K ¡ 1) for mA = K:
If for workers A it is still optimal to supply h; nothing changes with respect
to Proposition 2, except that now all players correctly expect that q minority
workers are actually promoted. For minority workers to realize that they are
overestimating the percentage of discriminatory employers, the only way is to
impose a q “big enough” to make (one or both types of) workers A choose i in-
stead of h: At that point, the number of minority workers who are promoted will
be strictly greater than q contradicting their beliefs.29 It is worth of notice that
the price for such a result, when achievable, is that both majority workers and
employers are strictly worse o¤ by the introduction of quotas, which probably
makes it not very easy to implement. A similar trade-o¤ between equity and
e¢ciency associated to a¢rmative action programs can also be found within
uneven tournaments. Experimental evidence, however, do not provide support
for such a trade-o¤.30
Dealing with feedback e¤ects model, Cain (1986) raises a concern which also
applies to this model and, more generally, to all the models displaying multiple
equilibria some of which suboptimal:
“model’s predicted consequences from a favorable shock are so
obviously bene…cial to the group discriminated against and to em-
ployers that is di¢cult to see why the upward spiral would not
quickly be initiated by group intervention.”
This argument suggests that it should not be di¢cult to break down unequal
outcomes based on workers’ expectations, and this is certainly true as far as the
28Notice that the LHS is negatively correlated with q.
29It is problematic to provide a sensible translation of “big enough”, since this threshold





=1(absence of discriminatory tastes) and K =1 :2, i.e. around the middle of
the range that makes it optimal for both types of worker A to exert h; even imposing balanced
promotions, i.e. q =0 :5; is not enough to break down the mechanism behind unequal outcomes
b a s e do nw o r k e r s ’e x p e c t a t i o n s .
30See Schotter and Weigelt (1992) and Corns and Schotter (1999).
25mathematics of the model is concerned. Many devices can perform this task,
like a subsidy to minority workers who exert e¤ort h, or a free insurance that
pays back the money equivalent of the utility loss su¤ered by minority workers
who supplied a high e¤ort without being promoted, and so on. Nevertheless,
this devices do not seem to have an intuitive counterpart on the …eld. The
bottom line is that, in line with Coate and Loury (1993), the best way to
correct unequal outcomes is to a¤ect expectations of minorities.31 Policy tools
which do not change the expectations of minorities are either ine¤ective or very
di¢cult to implement.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The goal of this paper is to set up a model where preferences and beliefs of both
sides of the labor market matter. A framework is obtained where most of the
contributions to the discrimination literature can be nested. Moreover, the role
of workers’ expectations, almost neglected in the literature, can be analyzed.
A game of incomplete information is presented, showing that ex ante identical
groups of workers may be characterized by unequal outcomes in equilibrium be-
cause of their di¤erent beliefs. The importance of workers’ expectations can be
appreciated comparing the distribution of promotions that arises when minority
workers overestimate the percentage of discriminatory employers with a situa-
tion in which such beliefs are correct ceteris paribus. With the only purpose of
testing workers’ expectations as a “stand alone” mechanism, the comparison is
made imposing appropriate assumptions that rules out other possible sources of
unequal outcomes.
Unequal outcomes may arise due to workers’ expectations. In this circum-
stance what happens is that wrong beliefs to be discriminated against are self-
con…rming. Minority groups who expect to be discriminated against supply less
e¤ort on average, because of a lower expected return. This induces a lower per-
centage of promotions within minority workers, even though employers do not
discriminate against them either directly or statistically. Nevertheless, unbal-
anced promotions are consistent with their beliefs that there are employers with
discriminatory tastes. This mechanism implies that workers’ expectations to be
discriminated against are important in reducing the e¤ectiveness of promotion
as an incentive device and they can contribute to explain the puzzling long run
persistence of cumulative discrimination.
Minority workers do not “test” their beliefs, meaning that they do not verify
whether the employers would have promoted them had they chosen higher e¤ort.
The reason is that no single worker has any incentive to experiment, because
his observation would have a negligible information value. Moreover, trial work
periods, which can break down statistical discrimination outcomes, are not an
e¤ective policy tool as long as workers have expectations of employers’ discrimi-
natory tastes. Furthermore, wrong beliefs of minority workers are unlikely to be
31For instance, the Gay Pride can also be thought as a device that reduces the sexual
minorities’ expectations to be discriminated against in the labor market.
26modi…ed by the introduction of quotas. The game suggests that the best way
to get rid of unequal outcomes driven by workers’ expectations is using beliefs
themselves as a target. The next step is a laboratory experiment which can
provide empirical evidence about the importance of workers’ expectations as a
source of unequal outcomes (Filippin, 2002b).
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